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Legal tensions are growing as more jurisdictions move towards legal regulation of the cannabis 
market, in clear contravention of the obligation of the UN drug control treaties to limit cannabis 
exclusively to medical and scientific purposes. Reaching a new global consensus to amend the 
conventions does not appear to be a viable political option in the foreseeable future. Amongst 
the limited options not requiring consensus, inter se modification—based on article 41 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties—appears to provide a useful safety valve for 
collective action to adjust a treaty regime arguably frozen in time. Restrictions imposed on 
inter se modification require that an agreement to derogate from certain cannabis treaty 
provisions include a clear commitment to the original treaty aim to promote the health and 
welfare of humankind and to the original treaty obligations vis-à-vis states not party to the 
agreement. A coordinated collective response has benefits compared to a chaotic scenario of 
multiple unilateral reservations and questionable re-interpretations. 
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The drug policy landscape is in a process of profound change since more and more countries 
are moving towards a legal regulation of the cannabis market. This reality is increasing legal 
tensions within the international drug control regime, based on the 1961 Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs1 and its 1972 Protocol2 and supplemented with the 1971 Convention on 
Psychotropic Substances3 and the 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances4. Article 4 of the Single Convention obliges all parties ‘to limit 
exclusively to medical and scientific purposes the production, manufacture, export, import, 
distribution of, trade in, use and possession of drugs’ placed under its control, and cannabis has 
been listed under its strictest control schedules.5  
 
The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB or Board), the ‘independent and quasi- 
judicial expert body’6 for monitoring compliance with the 1961 and 1971 drug control treaties, 
has condemned these steps as contrary to states’ international obligations. In its Annual Report 
for 2016, for example, the INCB commented on Canada’s intention to move to a regulated 
market for cannabis: 
 
Canada is party to all three international drug control treaties. The Government has initiated a 
process that has as its goal the legalization and regulation of access to cannabis for non-medical 
use. The Board notes that the legalization of the use of cannabis for non-medical purposes is 
inconsistent with the provisions of the 1961 and 1988 Conventions because the Conventions 
oblige States parties to limit the use of narcotic drugs exclusively to medical and scientific 
purposes. That limitation, expressed in article 4, paragraph (c), of the 1961 Convention, is 
binding on all parties; regulating the use of drugs outside medical and scientific purposes is not 
allowed under the Convention. The limitation of the use of drugs to medical and scientific 
purposes is a fundamental principle that lies at the heart of the international drug control 
framework, to which no exception is possible and which gives no room for flexibility. The 
Board urges the Government to pursue its stated objectives—namely the promotion of health, 
the protection of young people and the decriminalization of minor, non- violent offences—
within the existing drug control system of the Conventions.7 
 
Canada’s Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland, in May 2018, indeed acknowledged that Bill C-
45 to regulate cannabis ‘will result in Canada contravening certain obligations related to 
cannabis under the three UN drug convention’.8  ‘I think we need to be open about that’, she 
said, adding that the Canadian government is ‘definitely open to working with treaty partners 
to identify solutions that accommodate different approaches to cannabis within the 
 
1 New York, 30 March 1961, 520 UNTS 151, in force 13 December 1964. 
2 Geneva, 25 March 1972, 976 UNTS 3, in force 8 August 1975. 
3 Vienna, 21 February 1971, 1019 UNTS 175, in force 16 August 1976. 
4 Vienna, 20 December 1988, 1582 UNTS 95, in force 11 November 1990. 
5 Cannabis, cannabis resin, and extracts and tincture of cannabis are in Schedule I among substances whose 
properties might give rise to dependence and that present a serious risk of abuse; cannabis and cannabis resin are 
also listed in Schedule IV, along with a few other selected substances from Schedule I that are deemed 
particularly dangerous and having extremely limited therapeutic value. 
6 International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), https://www.incb.org/incb/en/index.html 
7 INCB, Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2016, New York, United Nations (2017), para 
223, p.31. For similar remarks in regard to the adoption of similar schemes in other states parties see also 
(United States) para 198, p.29 and (Jamaica) para 415, p.55. Also see INCB, Report of the International 
Narcotics Control Board for 2017, New York, United Nations (2018), paras 185-187, p. 36. 
8 Chrystia Freeland, Minister of Foreign Affairs, The Standing Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and 




international framework.’9 The existing legal regulations at state level in the U.S. and in 
Uruguay are already clearly out of compliance with the provisions of the UN drug treaties, and 
as more nations like Canada contemplate this step, treaty tensions will continue to mount.  
 
This article explores the option of an inter se agreement among like-minded parties for 
effecting compatibility of cannabis regulation with commitments under the UN drug control 
conventions. Article 41 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)10 
provides for such agreements between two or more parties in order to modify a multilateral 
treaty like a drug convention. The VCLT, the ‘treaty on treaties’,11 was drafted by the 
International Law Commission (ILC), established by the General Assembly in 1947 to ‘initiate 
studies and make recommendations for the purpose of ... encouraging the progressive 
development of international law and its codification’.12 According to one of the VCLT 
commentaries: 
 
Due to the conflicting interests prevailing at an international level, amendments of multilateral 
treaties, especially amendments of treaties with a large number of parties, prove to be an 
extremely difficult and cumbersome process; sometimes, an amendment seems even 
impossible. It may thus happen that some of the States Parties wish to modify the treaty as 
between themselves alone.13 
 
9 Ibidem. 
10 Vienna, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, in force 27 January 1980. Although the main topic of this piece is the 
legal effect of an inter se agreement among parties to Single Convention, which was concluded in 1961, eight 
years prior to the conclusion of the VCLT, in strictly formal terms the VCLT is not applicable because article 4 
of the VCLT applies a principle of non-retroactivity, unless it crystallizes a rule that exists independently of the 
VCLT. Paul McDade, “The Effect of Article 4 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties 1969” 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Volume 35, (1986) p. 499, at p. 502, takes a formalistic view 
arguing that only provisions of the VLCT which are clearly declaratory of customary international law govern 
preexisting treaties. Oliver Dörr, Kirsten Schmalenbach, “Article 41. Agreements to modify multilateral treaties 
between certain of the parties only” in O. Dörr, and K. Schmalenbach (eds), Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, Springer-Verlag, Berlin and Heidelberg, 2012, p.719 at p.721 et seq note that while modification inter 
se was not an uncommon practice there were no common rules on the subject prior to the VCLT and thus article 
41 did not codify an already existing rule of customary law. However, inter se modification was an isolated but 
growing reality by the time of the conclusion of the VCLT. Anne Rigaux and Denys Simon, Article 41: 
Agreements to Modify Multilateral Treaties Between Certain of the Parties Only, in: Olivier Corsten and Pierre 
Klein (eds), The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary, Vol. II, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press (2011), p. 986 at pp. 991 et seq explain that the absence of generalised jurisprudence on this matter was 
because inter se treaties had not given significant difficulties until the 20th Century and they had only really 
surfaced as an issue with the rise of multilateral treaties. In a sense then, article 41 is a belated solution to an 
existing problem, although the substance of the article was already in evidence in article 22(b) of the Harvard 
Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 29, Special Supplement 
(1935) p.1016. Shabtai Rosenne in “The Temporal Application of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties” in Cornell International Law Journal, Volume 4, Issue 1 (1970), p. 1, a p.20 provides, we submit, the 
most practical way of approaching this conundrum because he dismisses the importance of article 4, arguing that 
the VCLT largely consolidated customary internal law. At p. 19 he notes that the VCLT often provides a clearer 
and more effective definition of the customary law that it consolidates, and noting at p. 22 that only arid 
formalism would insist that a rule such as that contained in article 41 was not a “rule of international law” as 
anticipated in article 4 of the VCLT, applicable to a general dispute about a treaty. We would argue that given 
the scanty basis for practice in regard to inter se modification, those that deny article 41is applicable, bear the 
burden of establishing it inapplicability. 
11 Anthony Aust, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, June 2006. http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e1498 
12 Charter of the United Nations, article 13 (1) (a). See: http://legal.un.org/ilc/ 
13 Oliver Dörr and Kirsten Schmalenbach, eds., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary, 




Such an inter se modification agreement is permissible if (a) ‘the possibility of such a 
modification is provided for by the treaty’ or (b) when ‘the modification in question is not 
prohibited by the treaty and (i) does not affect the enjoyment by the other parties of their rights 
under the treaty or the performance of their obligations; or (ii) does not relate to a provision, 
derogation from which is incompatible with the effective execution of the object and purpose 
of the treaty as a whole.’14 
 
Before exploring these conditions for the operation of article 41, it should be noted that in terms 
of the rubric to article 41 such inter se agreements ‘modify the treaty between themselves 
alone’, i.e., they create a special regime but only for their parties. They do not alter the general 
regime, to which the parties to the inter se agreement remain bound and which they must 
respect ‘in their relations with the other parties as if the inter se agreement did not exist.’15 This 
rubric respects the pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt rule of international law (treaties neither 
obligate nor benefit third parties) consolidated in article 34 of the VCLT that such agreements 
cannot create rights or impose obligations on other non- parties to the inter se agreement which 
are party to the drug conventions. Article 41 is designed to ensure that such agreements do not 
provide a back-door to amendment of the treaty as a whole in violation of this rule. 
 
Most such modifications cause little difficulty because they are designed to ‘implement, update 
and strengthen the treaty in the relations between the parties to the modifying treaty’,16 i.e., to 
add to the rule, not to relax the rule. In deliberations on the draft version of article 41 the ILC 
clarified that ‘a modification was not always necessarily the reversal of a rule in the amended 
instrument (amendment contra legem); the effect of the modification might be to add something 
that was consistent with that instrument (amendment secundum legem) or to remove doubts which 
had arisen (amendment praeter legem).’17 Inter se agreements of the second kind (secundum or 
intra legem) are usually unproblematic. The Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty,18 for example, 
deliberately promotes the inter se mechanism to agree on stricter provisions among groups of 
countries, for example the creation of nuclear-free zones, than could be reached in the negotiations 
between all the parties. Modifications of this kind must meet the implicit double imperative of 
guaranteeing stability of general relations among the parties while enabling movement in special 
relations of certain parties.19 
 
An inter se agreement on cannabis regulation would however clearly fall in the category of a 
contra legem modification. The preparatory work of the VCLT and subsequent discussions at the 
ILC leave no doubt that the inter se mechanism can also be used contra legem, to derogate from 
certain treaty provisions, something that might be seen as a ‘collective reservation’ by two or 
more of the parties (although it should be noted that there are subtle but important differences 
between the rules governing reservations and the rules governing inter se modification—see 
below at footnote 52), otherwise there would have been no need to specify the conditions regarding 
 
14 United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, May 23, 1969, United Nations Treaty 
Series 1155, no. 18232 (1980), article 41, paragraph 1. 
15 A/CN.4/L.682, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law, Finalized by M Koskenniemi, International Law Commission (ILC 2006), para 
305, p. 157. 
16 Ibid., para 297, p. 152. 
17 International Law Commission (ILC), ‘Summary Record of the 746th Meeting: 13 July 1964’, 
A/CN.4/SR.764, in: Yearbook of the International Law Commission: 1964, vol. I (New York: UN, 1965), para 
104, p. 274. 
18 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1 July 1968, 729 UNTS 161; in force 5 March 1970. 
19 Suzanne Bastid, Les Traités dans la vie Internationale, (Paris: Economica, 1985), p.179. 
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the rights of other parties and the object and purpose of a treaty.20 
 
For like-minded states parties that have introduced domestically a legally regulated cannabis 
market for non-medical purposes, an inter se modification agreement would resolve the 
legal tension with certain cannabis-related provisions of the drug conventions. After 
derogating from those provisions by means of inter se modification—similar to the effect 
of a unilateral reservation—those states would no longer be in breach of their treaty 
obligations. They may, however, face a claim by other non-parties to the inter se agreement 
that are parties to the drug conventions that they have tried to modify their relationship with 
all parties. Evidence of ‘the spill-over effect that legalization may have in neighbouring 
jurisdictions where the use of cannabis for non-medical purposes remains illegal’21 might 
lend substance to this claim. But simple modification of the rule itself may already entitle 
such a response because it may affect, for example, reporting duties to the INCB. The Board 
administers a system of estimates for narcotic drugs, including cannabis,22 and monitors licit 
activities through a statistical returns system ‘to ensure that adequate supplies of drugs are 
available for medical and scientific uses and that the diversion of drugs from licit sources to 
illicit channels does not occur.’23 It is unclear whether the INCB and the regulating states 
parties would be willing to consider expanding the administrative system to include 
estimates and requirements of cannabis for other purposes that would become licit under an 
inter se agreement, but remain illicit under the UN convention for the other parties. 
 
In the case of Bolivia’s reservation on coca leaf, in fact the INCB in its latest Annual Report 
does invite the country ‘to furnish to it separate estimates and statistical reports in respect of 
the reserved activities, in addition to the estimates and statistics mandatory under article 19, 
article 20 and article 27, paragraph 2, of the 1961 Convention as amended. These estimates and 
statistical reports should specify the quantities of coca leaf that are estimated to be used and 
actually used in the country for the reserved purposes.’24 Similar separate estimates and 
statistics could be provided on non-medical and non-scientific purposes of cannabis allowed 
under an inter se agreement. The amended Single Convention only requires furnishing 
estimates and statistics for the licit cultivation of opium poppy.25 In the case of coca and 
 
20 While the conditions for the operation of reservations are spelled out in articles 19-21 of the VCLT, the ILC 
in its discussion about reservations specifically mentions that the same conditions basically apply to inter se 
modification, see A/CN.4/L.682, Fragmentation of International Law, (ILC 2006), op. cit., p. 159. 
21 INCB, Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2016, para 325, p. 42. 
22 According to the INCB, ‘The licit use of cannabis has been increasing considerably since 2000. Before 2000, 
licit use was restricted to scientific research and was reported only by the United States. Since 2000, more and 
more countries have started to use cannabis and cannabis extracts for medical purposes, as well as for scientific 
research. In 2000, total licit production was 1.4 tons; by 2016 it had increased to 209.9 tons. … In 2016, the 
United Kingdom was the main producer, with 95 tons (44.9 per cent of the total), followed by Canada, with 80.7 
tons, mostly intended for domestic consumption. They were followed by Portugal (21 tons), Israel (9.2 tons), the 
Netherlands and Chile (both 1.4 tons)’. INCB, Report 2017, Estimated World Requirements for 2018 - Statistics 
for 2016, p. 43. 
23 INCB, Mandate and Functions, http://www.incb.org/incb/ en/about/mandate-functions.html  
24 INCB, Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2017, New York, United Nations (2018), para 
144, pp. 31-32. 
25 The 1972 Protocol amending the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs introduced the requirement to 
provide annual estimates of ‘The area (in hectares) and the geographical location of land to be used for the 
cultivation of the opium poppy’ in article 19(1)(e); and statistics on ‘Ascertainable area of cultivation of the 
opium poppy’ in article 20(1)(g). According to the Commentary, the wording ‘ascertainable’ was introduced to 
clarify that Parties need only make such efforts that ‘can reasonably be expected of them’: ‘They are certainly 
not required to search out every little garden patch on which opium poppies are grown for decorative purposes’. 
Commentary on the Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, Done at Geneva on 25 
March 1972, United Nations (New York 1976), para 5, pp. 56-57. 
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cannabis, only data on the harvested amounts—in kilogrammes—of coca leaf, cannabis buds 
and resin are required, not the amount or location of hectares cultivated.26 The provision of 
additional data on cannabis production for other licit purposes under a reservation or inter se 
agreement would not therefore need to include details on areas of cultivation.  
 
A special system of non-prohibition of cannabis among some parties at a domestic level 
formalised in an inter se agreement appears to be impossible if those same states have promised 
a large number of other parties that they will maintain a general system of prohibition of 
cannabis for non-medical and non-scientific purposes, and the special system may necessitate 
changes to the general system. Analysis of the two additional conditions in article 41 shows 
how they are designed to constrain the actions of parties to reduce the risk of ‘true 
incompatibility’ between the general obligations—the drug conventions—and the special 
obligations—the inter se agreement— thus avoiding bringing into play article 30 of the VCLT’s 
rules about incompatible successive treaty obligations.27 In other words, adherence to the 
conditions in article 41 avoids a situation of normative conflict where parties to an inter se 
agreement modify not only their relations among themselves but generally. This provokes the 
key question the rest of this article explores: can domestic cannabis reform which is harmonised 
among like-minded states by an inter se agreement and which may even permit international 
trade in cannabis among these parties, avoid unacceptable interference with the rights of non-
parties to the inter-se agreement and avoid substantive incompatibility with the drug 
conventions? 
 
2 Balancing Treaty Stability and Change 
 
Article 41 has a Janus-faced quality in that it looks backward to maintaining stability of the 
treaty and forward to its modification for some parties so long as they do not disturb that 
stability. During the ILC deliberations on the VCLT, it was observed that with the adoption of 
a special article on inter se modification, the Commission ‘had reached an ingenious 
compromise between the need to recognize the rights of the parties to a treaty in its initial form 
and the need to permit the modification of the treaty in order to take account of certain 
international requirements. But care should be taken to maintain flexibility so as to meet the 
requirements of the international community.’28 The drafters of the VCLT considered the 
option of inter se modifications as a core principle for international law and the issue was 
discussed at length at the ILC in 1964: ‘The importance of the subject needed no emphasis; it 
involved reconciling the need to safeguard the stability of treaties with the requirements of 
peaceful change.’29 The words of U.S. Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius Jr., head of the 
U.S. delegation to the 1945 San Francisco Conference at which the founding United Nations 
Charter was adopted, were repeated during the discussion in this regard in the ILC: ‘Those who 
seek to develop procedures for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, always 
confront the hard task of striking a balance between the necessity of assuring stability and 
 
26 The INCB secretariat, however, in December 2014, adapted Part III(B) and (C) in the 18 th edition of Form C 
on Annual Statistics of Production, Manufacture, Consumption, Stocks and Seizures of Narcotic Drugs, adding 
columns for submitting data on hectares of licit cannabis and coca cultivation, without specifying that such 
information is requested on a voluntary basis, not as a treaty requirement. 
27 Anne Rigaux and Denys Simon, Article 41: Agreements to Modify Multilateral Treaties Between Certain of 
the Parties Only, in: Olivier Corsten and Pierre Klein (eds), The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A 
Commentary, Vol. II, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2011), pp.986-988. 
28 A/CN.4/SER.A/1966, Yearbook of the International Law Commission: 1966, Vol. I, Part I, 876th meeting, 23 
June 1966, (ILC: New York, United Nations 1967), p. 219. 
29 A/CN.4/SR.745, “Summary Record of the 745th Meeting: 15 June 1964”, in: Yearbook of the International 
Law Commission: 1964, Vol. I (ILC: New York, United Nations 1965), para. 49, p. 144. 
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security on the one hand and of providing room for growth and adaptation on the other.’30 
 
Merkouris and Fitzmaurice record that it was not disputed in the ILC that inter se agreements 
are ‘an essential technique, and a necessary safety valve, for the adjustment of treaties to the 
dynamic needs of international society. If such a technique had not existed, there would have 
been stagnation in many treaty relations… The inter se procedure had been the means resorted 
to for that necessary evolution.’31 The VCLT therefore needed to ‘make provision for the inter 
se procedure so as to avoid the stagnation that would result from the liberum veto of a single 
party’.32 From the very beginning, its evolutionary nature was seen as fundamental to the 
United Nations system, a system in which according to the Egyptian delegate all member states 
‘undertake to respect agreements and treaties to which they have become contracting parties 
without prejudice to the right of revision’.33  It was therefore ‘equally important to ensure that 
arbitrary obstacles were not allowed to impede the process of change. There had been many 
instances in the past of States, by their stubborn refusal to consider modifying a treaty, forcing 
others to denounce it.’34 
 
That is precisely what happened after Bolivia adopted a new constitution in 2009 which 
required the state to protect the coca leaf as part of its cultural patrimony.35 Acknowledging 
that state regulation of the domestic coca market for non-medical purposes was contrary to its 
obligations under the drug control conventions, Bolivia had to face many obstacles and limited 
options to reconcile its national and international legal obligations, including a failed—though 
formally still pending—attempt to amend the Single Convention.36 In the end, as noted above, 
Bolivia chose to denounce the Single Convention only to re-accede a year later with a 
reservation regarding the coca leaf. As will be argued below, this could be seen as a precedent 
for the key question addressed in this article. However, while the procedure resolved the legal 
conflict surrounding its domestic coca market, as the INCB underscored, the reservation ‘is 
explicitly limited to activities within its territory, thus not conferring and/or broadening any 
rights to engage in international trade of any kind’.37 To legitimise international trade, any 
country interested in importing the now licitly produced Bolivian coca leaf would first have to 
go through a similar procedure of denunciation and re-accession with a reservation on coca leaf 
that would also allow imports. Instead, signing an inter se agreement between Bolivia and those 
countries could offer a more practicable solution, also making it easier for new countries to 
join by simply signing up to an already existing agreement. 
 
3 The permissibility of inter se modification 
 
30 Ibidem. 
31 Panos Merkouris and Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Re‐Shaping Treaties While Balancing Interests of Stability and 
Change: Critical Issues in the Amendment/Modification/Revision of Treaties, University of Groningen Faculty 
of Law Research Paper Series, No. 11/2016, November 2015, p. 17. 
32 Uruguayan representative Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, A/CN.4/SR.745 (ILC 1965), op. cit., para 35, p. 
150.  
33 Egyptian representative Abdullah El-Erian, A/CN.4/SR.745 (ILC 1965), op. cit., para 53, p. 144. 
34 Ibidem. 
35 Constitution of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, 2009, Article 384: “The State protects the native and 
ancestral coca as cultural patrimony, as a renewable natural resource of the biodiversity of Bolivia, and as a 
factor of social unity. In its natural state coca is not a narcotic. The revaluation, production, sale and 
industrialization of coca shall be governed by law.” 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Bolivia_2009.pdf 
36 International Drug Policy Consortium, Bolivia’s Legal Reconciliation with the UN Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs, IDPC Advocacy Note, 2011. 
37 INCB, Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2017, New York, United Nations (2018), para 




3.1 Specific treaty provisions 
Article 41(a) of the VCLT provides for inter se modification among like-minded parties if ‘the 
possibility of such a modification is provided for by the treaty’. An express provision of this kind 
illustrates general consent among the parties to further modification among parties. An early 
example of such a special agreement, article 19 of the 1883 Paris Convention on the Protection 
of Industrial Property38 clarifies that parties reserve the right to make them ‘in so far as these 
agreements do not contravene the provisions of this Convention.’ A more recent example, article 
311(3) of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),39 provides expressly for 
inter se agreements modifying or suspending the provisions of the UNCLOS. It states: 
 
Two or more States Parties may conclude agreements modifying or suspending the operation of 
provisions of this Convention, applicable solely to the relations between them, provided that 
such agreements do not relate to a provision derogation from which is incompatible with the 
effective execution of the object and purpose of this Convention, and provided further that such 
agreements shall not affect the application of the basic principles embodied therein, and that 
the provisions of such agreements do not affect the enjoyment by other States parties of their 
rights or the performance of their obligation under the Convention. 
 
Reinforcing the point made earlier about the limited material scope of these inter se 
agreements, article 311(3) clarifies that such agreements are permitted to modify or suspend 
the operations of the Convention solely among themselves, without affecting the rights of 
others. This suggests that derogating modification is limited to provisions of the convention 
that can be isolated bilaterally without affecting the rights of others. This is reinforced by the 
repetition in the rest of article 311(3) of the formula in article 41 prohibiting limitation or 
suspension of a provision the derogation of which is incompatible with the effective execution 
of the object and purpose of the convention. It suggests that whether such derogating 
modification is permitted depends on the nature of the provision that is being derogated from 
by the inter se agreement. To reinforce this point, it can be noted that inter se modifications to 
the Treaty for the European Union envisaging cooperation in the area of justice were restricted 
to those that did not undermine the internal market or restrict trade.40 The drug conventions do 
make express provision for modification inter se of certain kinds of provisions, but these 
provisions are limited to modifications complementing and enhancing the effectiveness of law 
enforcement measures in the drug conventions such as article 6(11) of the 1988 Trafficking 
Convention, which provides that the ‘Parties shall seek to conclude bilateral and multilateral 
agreements to carry out or enhance the effectiveness of extradition.’ 
 
Where the treaty is silent on this question, VCLT article 41(b) permits modification not 
expressly provided for by the treaty if ‘the modification in question is not prohibited by the 
treaty’, subject to two additional conditions. In order to be permissible these two additional 
conditions require that the modification (i) does not affect the rights of other parties under the 
treaty and (ii) ‘does not relate to a provision, derogation from which is incompatible with the 
effective execution of the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole’. There are no specific 
provisions in the drug conventions prohibiting inter se modification. The question remains 
whether the drug conventions are to be construed as impliedly prohibiting an inter se 
modification involving the establishment of a non-medical market for the production and 
consumption of cannabis. It appears clear from the deliberations in the ILC, however, that it 
 
38 Paris, 20 March 1883 (as further amended), in force 7 July 1884. 
39 Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3, in force 16 November 1994. 
40 Rigaux and Simon (2011), op. cit., p.1000, referring to Article 43(1) TEU. 
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that only when a modification failed the second condition one or both of the two additional 
conditions in article 41(b) could it be considered impliedly prohibited by the convention in 
question.41 It follows that the permissibility of modification is a question of whether an inter 
se agreement between like-minded states parties with regard to cannabis (or coca) regulation 
can meet either of the two additional conditions, as both must be met.42 
 
3.2 Affecting the Rights of Other Parties 
Article 41(b) (i) provides that the inter se agreement to modify a treaty is permissible if it ‘does 
not affect the enjoyment by the other parties of their rights under the treaty or the performance 
of their obligations’. The condition is a reflection of the principle res inter alios acta,43 which 
runs through article 41 as a whole, based on the fact that the other parties have not consented 
to the transformation of their rights or obligations.44 In essence, this condition is designed to 
ensure that an inter se agreement to which certain states are not party does not burden them in 
any way. 
 
The drug conventions set out a complex and extensive range of obligations on states parties. A 
reservation or inter se agreement among a limited number of parties that would increase the 
burden on states that were not party to the inter se agreement but which were party to the drug 
conventions would clearly not be permissible. A question of relevance to this article is whether 
such a burden on other states would be imposed if one or more parties decide not to prohibit 
but regulate the sale and supply of cannabis. That is, however, not a question that can be 
answered in the abstract. It requires proof that the new system of regulation interferes with the 
other parties’ rights or obligations under the treaty. This question will be further explored in 
sections 6 and 7 below in the context of an analysis of the nature of the drug control treaties 
and their prohibitive provisions. 
 
3.3 Compatibility with the Object and Purpose 
Article 41(b) (ii) provides that the inter se agreement is permissible if it ‘does not relate to a 
provision, derogation from which is incompatible with the effective execution of the object 
and purpose of the treaty as a whole.’ The ILC has devoted a lot of attention to defining the 
concept of the object and purpose of treaties in the context of its in-depth consideration of treaty 
reservations, and the ‘concerns expressed in those debates are not essentially different from 
concerns that seem relevant also for deciding the permissibility of inter se agreements under 
article 41’.45 The ILC’s 10th  report on reservations refers to the opinion of the International 
Court of Justice that the object and purpose of a treaty can be deduced: 1) from its title; 2) from 
its preamble; 3) from an article placed at the beginning of the treaty that ‘must be regarded as 
fixing an objective, in the light of which the other treaty provisions are to be interpreted and 
applied’; 4) from an article of the treaty that demonstrates ‘the major concern of each 
 
41 Rigaux and Simon (2011), op. cit., p. 994, citing the Report of the ILC to the General Assembly, A/5809, 
YILC, 1964, Vol. II, p.197. The ILC actually only referred expressly to failure of the second condition in this 
regard. 
42 See Anthony Aust, “Amendment of Treaties”, in: Alexander Orakhelashvili and Sarah Williams, 40 Years of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (London: BICL 2010), pp. 41 & 53. 
43 Res inter alios acta, aliis nec nocet nec prodest, literally ‘a thing done between others does not harm or 
benefit others’: the basic principle that a contract or legal agreement cannot affect the rights of non-parties. 
44 Rigaux and Simon (2011), op. cit., p. 1002. 
45 A/CN.4/L.682, Fragmentation of International Law, (ILC 2006), op. cit., para 309, p. 159. Concern with the 
concept was not unique to treaty modification, but was also essential to the ILC’s discussions, for example, of 
treaty interpretation. See the Third Report on the law of treaties, by Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special 
Rapporteur, UN Doc A/CN.4/167 and Add.1-3, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1964, Vol. 11, 
p. 52. Indeed, it runs through the whole of the treaty law regime. 
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contracting party’ when it concluded the treaty; 5) from the preparatory work on the treaty; and 
6) from its overall framework. Still, on that basis ‘the Court forms a “general impression”, in 
which intuition and subjectivity inevitably play a large part.’46 The ILC underscores the 
difficulties involved in defining the object and purpose of a treaty and concludes: ‘At most, one 
can infer that a fairly general approach is required: it is not a question of “dissecting” the treaty 
in minute detail and examining its provisions one by one, but of extracting the “essence”, the 
overall “mission” of the treaty.’47 This condition is thus not concerned with minor 
modifications, but with modifications that impact on the raison d’être of the conventions,48 on 
the system as a whole.49 Jonas and Saunders point to the difference in wording between articles 
41 and the provision on formulation of reservations in article 19 of the Vienna convention on 
the Law of Treaties:  
 
Article 41 also differs from Article 19 because it contains the words “effective execution” and 
“as a whole,” which may be read as limiting and softening the prohibition. In other words, 
a modification may permissibly infringe on the object and purpose somewhat, so long as the 
object and purpose is preserved as a whole. Functionally, a less stringent standard may be 
justified on the grounds that a modification, which is concluded between only a fraction of 
states party, is presumably less disruptive than a reservation, which the reserving state makes 
vis-à-vis all other states party.50 
  
The object and purpose of the drug control treaties is primarily laid down firstly in the preamble 
of the Single Convention which spells out that it is ‘Concerned with the health and welfare of 
mankind’, and secondly through the ‘general obligation’ in article 4 to ‘limit exclusively to 
medical and scientific purposes the production, manufacture, export, import, distribution of, 
trade in, use and possession of drugs’.51 A reservation or inter se agreement that would depart 
from those basic principles for all the substances controlled under these treaties would clearly 
not be permissible. The question is, however, whether the effective execution of the object and 
purpose of the treaty as a whole would be immediately compromised if one or more parties 
decide not to prohibit but regulate the sale and supply of cannabis for other purposes. This 
cannot be an abstract question. Interference with other parties’ rights can only be established 
by proof that the inter se agreement results in an infringement of the ‘effective execution’ of 
the treaty, and not just a formal infringement which has no concrete effect. Non-parties to the 
inter se agreement that assert alteration of their rights and obligations must substantiate that 
claim, mainly because only they have the information relating to the impact of the inter se 
modification within their territories. To meet the implicit threshold of proof in article 
41(1)(b)(i) they will have to show that the inter se modification has a negative impact on their 
 
46 A/CN.4/558/Add.1, Alain Pellet, Special Rapporteur, Tenth report on reservations to treaties, Addendum, 
(ILC 14 June 2005), para 81-82, p. 11. 
47 Ibid., para 77, p.9. See also Isabelle Buffard and Karl Zemanek, “The ‘Object” and ‘Purpose’ of a Treaty: An 
Enigma?, Austrian Review of International and European Law, Vol. 3 (1998), p.311 who after charting in 
considerable detail the incoherence of the concept note at p. 330 that its determination depends on the treaty 
being interpreted as a whole. 
48 International Court of Justice, Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, (ICJ 1951), Report 15, p. 21. 
49 WT/DS34/R, WTO Dispute Settlement Panel Report, Turkey-Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing 
Products, 31 May 1999, para 9, p. 181. 
50 David S Jonas and Thomas N Saunders, “The Object and Purpose of a Treaty: Three Interpretive Methods”, in 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 43, Issue 3 (2010), p. 565 at p. 575 (footnotes omitted). 
51 The 1988 Convention effectively supplements the 1961 Convention in regard to law enforcement activity, so 
it is the 1961 Convention which delimits the essential scope of permissible conduct in regard to particular 
substances. Therefore its object and purpose are largely determinative in this regard, although the object and 
purpose of the 1971 Convention (see below) is also relevant. 
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rights or obligations that is actual and not simply theoretical. 
 
 
4 The Uncertain Historical Status of Cannabis in the 1961 Convention 
 
The questions (i) of the rights and obligations of other parties in regard to cannabis and (ii) the 
object and purpose of the drug conventions in regard to cannabis cannot be adequately dealt 
with without some sense of the uncertain historical status of the substance within the system. 
The history of how cannabis came to be subject to control is relevant to the subject matter of 
this article. The exceptions relative to cannabis cannot be viewed as incompatible with the 
object and purpose of the conventions since from its inception the system has acknowledged 
exceptions to the prohibition of cannabis. Cannabis was brought under international control by 
the 1925 Geneva International Opium Convention and on that basis automatically entered the 
post-WWII drafting process for the UN Single Convention. Interestingly, with respect to 
cannabis, the limitation to medical and scientific purposes during this early period only applied 
to ‘Galenical preparations (extract and tincture) of Indian hemp’; and with regard to other 
purposes, the contracting parties were only required to ‘prohibit the export of the resin obtained 
from Indian hemp and the ordinary preparations of which the resin forms the base (such as 
hashish, esrar, chiras, djamba) to countries which have prohibited their use’ (article 11-a). The 
system of export authorisation and import certification established under article 12 of the 1925 
Convention and administered by the Permanent Central Board (PCB), a precursor body of 
today’s INCB, thus originally included cannabis for non-medical and non-scientific purposes. 
That also applied to the statistics states parties had to submit annually to the PCB: ‘estimates 
of the quantities of each of the substances covered by the Convention to be imported into their 
territory for internal consumption during the following year for medical, scientific and other 
purposes’ (article 21, emphasis added).  
 
The WHO Expert Committee stated in 1959 that it ‘believed that the composition of the 
schedules should be most carefully reviewed before they become an established part of the new 
Convention’, but this never happened in the case of cannabis and several other substances that 
were copy-pasted into the Single Convention’s draft schedule from the previous treaties.52 The 
scientific basis and even the procedural legality of the inclusion of cannabis in schedules I and 
IV (reserved for drugs that are ‘highly addictive and liable to abuse and rarely used in medical 
practice’53) is therefore questionable. Recognising that ‘cannabis has never been subject to a 
formal pre-review or critical review’, the WHO Expert Committee recommended at its 
November 2016 meeting to conduct pre-reviews for cannabis and its component substances.54 
 
At the time of negotiating the Single Convention, especially in Asia, Africa and the Middle 
East, cannabis was widely used and socially accepted for cultural, ceremonial and traditional 
medicinal purposes. The proposal to broaden the phrasing of the treaty’s general obligation ‘to 
limit exclusively to medical and scientific purposes’ by adding ‘and other legitimate purposes’ 
(wording that was used in the 1912 and 1925 treaties), which could have allowed the 
 
52 Esther Danenberg, L.A. Sorge, W. Wieniawski, S. Elliott , L. Amato, W.K. Scholten, “Modernizing 
methodology for the WHO assessment of substances form the international drug control conventions”, in: Drug 
and Alcohol Dependence, Vol. 131, Issue 3, 1 August 2013, pp. 175-324. 
53 E/CN.7/2014/10, Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Challenges and future work in the review of substances for 
possible scheduling recommendations: Note by the Secretariat, 18 December 2013, p. 13. 
54 WHO Expert Committee on Drug Dependence, Thirty-eighth report, WHO technical report series no. 1005, 
2017, pp. 35-36. 
12 
 
continuation of some of those centuries-old practices, was rejected.55 As a compromise, India 
managed to protect its bhang culture by excluding the leaves of the cannabis plant from the 
treaty’s definition of ‘cannabis’, and countries with widespread traditional cannabis uses were 
granted a special ‘transitional reservation’ option under article 49 to abolish those practices 
gradually over 25 years. For other reservations, article 50 specified certain restrictions 
including the procedure that if more than one-third of the parties object it would not be allowed. 
 
Of relevance to the key issue in this report is the fact that the official Commentary on the Single 
Convention raises the question whether the reservation procedure established under article 50 
could in principle be used by parties to reserve the right to allow non-medical uses of cannabis 
beyond the 25-year limit, and concludes that ‘[b]y operation of article 50, paragraph 3, a Party 
may reserve the right to permit the non-medical uses as provided in article 49, paragraph 1, of 
the drugs mentioned therein, … without being subject to the time limits and restrictions 
provided for in article 49’.56 Thus, according to the Commentary, unless more than one-third 
of the treaty parties would object, it could be legitimate for a country to reserve the right to 
allow non- medical uses of cannabis. It is strongly contended here that, in the absence of 
specific rules about it in the treaty, in principle the same permissibility would apply to an inter 
se modification agreement. Objecting Parties might try to argue that the same threshold of 
objections should apply to inter se modification as well, treating it basically as a ‘collective 
reservation’. However, the threshold for accepting reservations varies across treaties, and the 
1988 Trafficking Convention, for example, to which an inter se agreement on cannabis may 
also need to refer, does not include a procedure for objecting to reservations at all. The VCLT 
does not specify an objection procedure or threshold for acceptance for inter se modification 
agreements. The fact that the ILC has argued, as referred to above, that the basic criteria for 
permissibility of reservations are not ‘essentially different’ from those of inter se modification, 
does not imply that treaty-specific objection procedures regarding reservations should be 
applied in the same way to inter se agreements as well (see the section on Notification and 
Objections below). 
 
5 Divergence of control principles under the 1971 Convention 
 
An additional argument to support the view that the ‘integrity’ of the UN drug control treaty 
system would not be immediately compromised if countries make exemptions for cannabis, 
can be derived from the way in which the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances 
diverged from the 1961 Convention in regard to certain basic principles of its scheduling 
system. While ‘cannabis’ was scheduled as a ‘narcotic drug’ under the Single Convention, its 
main psychoactive compound, delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) or dronabinol, is included 
as a ‘psychotropic substance’ in Schedule II—and several isomers of THC even in Schedule 
I—of the 1971 Convention.57 Diverging from the zero-tolerant principle behind the Single 
Convention, the 1971 Convention allowed parties to make reservations for plants ‘which are 
traditionally used by certain small, clearly determined groups in magical or religious rites, … 
except for the provisions relating to international trade’.58 Moreover, it included a ‘principle of 
non-acceptance’ with regard to all scheduling decisions. A party was permitted to submit a 
notification explaining why, ‘in view of exceptional circumstances, it is not in a position to give 
 
55 David Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition: The 
History of Cannabis in the UN Drug Control System and Options for Reform, TNI/GDPO 2014, p. 25. 
56 United Nations, Commentary on the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, New York: 1973, p. 476. 
57 Christopher Hallam, David Bewley-Taylor and Martin Jelsma, Scheduling in the international drug control 
system, Series on Legislative Reform of Drug Policies No. 25, TNI/IDPC, June 2014, pp. 11-12. 
58 United Nations, Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971, Art. 32(4). 
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effect with respect to that substance to all of the provisions of the Convention’.59  
 
During the 1971 Conference, several developing countries objected to granting parties more ‘loop- 
holes’ for psychotropic substances ‘produced by the industrialized countries’ than had been 
allowed under the ‘transitional reservations’ for traditional plant-based narcotic drugs of the 
Single Convention.60 India argued that, given the fact that the draft text already made a ‘provision 
for review by the Economic and Social Council of decisions taken by the Commission on WHO 
recommendations, the right of non-acceptance would imply that an individual country could 
consider itself wiser than those three bodies, which spoke for the international community as a 
whole’, and suggested therefore to introduce a time limit on the right of non-acceptance.61 
Several Northern countries argued, however, that ‘[i]nsuperable difficulties could arise’ to obtain 
parliamentary acceptance of the treaty ‘unless provision were made in it for a degree of non- 
compliance with decisions by WHO and the Commission’ and that it would be unrealistic to 
impose ‘an arbitrary time limit for a situation of partial compliance’.62 
 
The 1971 Conference in the end adopted the right to partial non-compliance for specific 
substances without time restrictions. The compromise solution envisaged that the non-
acceptance of scheduling decisions was circumscribed ‘by control measures—graduated 
according to the various schedules—both national and international, which the non-accepting 
party should, in any case, apply to a given substance’.63 Those measures include the 
requirement of national licenses for manufacture, trade and distribution, and the provisions 
relating to international trade specified in articles 12 and 13. Regarding the latter, the non-
accepting State should still ‘[c]omply with the obligations relating to export and import … 
except in respect to another Party having given such notice for the substance in question’.64 
 
This permitted slippage in obligations tends to undermine the notion of an indissoluble and 
indestructible object and purpose in the drug conventions. The questionable status of cannabis 
in the general scheme of the conventions and in particular the failure to assess whether it has 
analogous qualities to other controlled drugs by the WHO expert committee means that there 
is a prima facie case that an inter se agreement formalising a shift to an alternative form of 
regulation for the substance would neither burden the other parties to the drug conventions nor 
run counter to the object and purpose of the drug conventions. These questions, however, can 
only be conclusively answered by reference to the nature of the drug conventions. 
 
6 Reciprocal versus absolute treaties 
 
Whether a contra legem inter se modification affects the rights of other parties, depends in the 
first place on the basic nature of the treaty, whether it has primarily what Fitzmaurice called 
‘reciprocal’, ‘interdependent’ or ‘integral’ characteristics,65 or what the ILC study group on the 
‘Fragmentation of International Law’ terms as the ‘distinction between treaties containing 
(merely) reciprocal obligations and treaties whose obligations were non-reciprocal—that is to 
 
59 Ibid., Art. 2(7). 
60 E/CONF.58/7/Add.I, United Nations Conference for the adoption of a Protocol on Psychotropic Substances, 
Vienna, 11 January - 19 February 1971, Official Records, Volume II, para 4, p. 133 (Liberia). 
61 Ibid, para 2, p.132 (India). 
62 Ibid, para 8 (United States), para 11 (Netherlands) and 3 (United Kingdom), p. 133. 
63 E/CONF.58/7/Add.I, op.cit., para 54, p. 181. 
64 United Nations, Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971, art. 2(7). 
65 A/CN.4/115, Gerald Fitzmaurice, Special Rapporteur, Third Report on the Law of Treaties, 18 March 1958, 
Extract from the Yearbook of the International Law Commission: 1958, Vol. II, pp. 27-28. 
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say, of a ‘more absolute type’.66 For example, the VCLT provides a special rule under article 
60 on invoking breach where ‘the treaty is of such a character that a material breach of its 
provisions by one party radically changes the position of every other party in respect to the 
further performance of its obligations under the treaty’. According to Sadat-Akhavi: 
 
A treaty is ‘interdependent’ when the obligation of each party is dependent on the 
corresponding performance by all the other parties, so that a fundamental breach by one party 
prejudices the treaty regime applicable between all parties. For instance, treaties on 
disarmament and treaties prohibiting the use of particular weapons are ‘interdependent’ treaties. 
An inter se agreement modifying the provisions of an ‘interdependent’ treaty should be unlawful 
since it necessarily affects the rights of third States under that treaty.67 
 
There is more flexibility with regard to treaties ‘which are of the reciprocating type, providing 
for a mutual interchange of benefits between the parties, with rights and obligations for each 
involving specific treatment at the hands of and towards each of the others individually.’68 
Reciprocal treaties are those in which rights and obligations are granted to other parties to the 
multilateral convention in a ‘quasi- bilateral fashion’ and inter se agreements are permissible 
because the subject matter of those rights—for example, diplomatic relations in the 1961 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations69—means that the impact of a specific change 
between two parties inter se can be confined to those parties, and has no effect on the rights of 
others or on the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole.70 They are unlike absolute treaties, 
which as Rigaux and Simon put it, ‘cannot be reduced to … bilateral relations, that are 
malleable à la carte.’71 
 
The ILC’s fragmentation study notes that absolute treaties are often used to unify rules of law 
in specific domains, to create an ‘obligation of solidarity’ among the parties, for which 
conformity with the object and purpose of the treaty serves as a legal test.72 Seamless wholes, 
breach of one rule radically changes the legal position of all other parties.73 Justice van Eysinga 
gave an example in his dissenting decision in the Oscar Chin Case, which involved a question 
of whether the 1919 Convention of Saint Germain-en-Laye, an inter se agreement, modified 
the older and much more broadly supported 1885 General Act of Berlin, in regard to the 
management of the Congo Basin: 
 
The General Act of Berlin does not create a number of contractual relations between a number 
of States, relations which may be replaced as regards some of these States by other contractual 
relations; it does not constitute jus dipositivum, but it provides the Congo Basin with a regime, 
a statute, a constitution. This regime which forms an indivisible whole may be modified, but 
for this the agreement of all the contracting Powers is required. An inextricable legal tangle 
would result if, for instance, it were held that the regime of neutralisation provided for in Article 
11 of the General Act might be in force for some contracting Powers while it had ceased to 
operate for certain others.74 
 
For Justice van Eysinga, the provision in the Berlin Act for amendment by ‘common accord’ 
 
66 A/CN.4/L.682, Fragmentation of International Law, (ILC 2006), op. cit., para 310, p. 159. 
67 Seyed Ali Sadat-Akhavi, Methods of Resolving Conflicts between Treaties, (Leiden: Nijhoff, 2003), p. 58. 
68 A/CN.4/115, Third Report on the Law of Treaties, op. cit., p. 27. 
69 Vienna, 18 April 1961, 500 UNTS 95, in force 24 April 1964. 
70 Rigaux and Simon (2011), op. cit., pp. 1003-4. 
71 Rigaux and Simon (2011), op. cit., p. 1004. 
72 A/CN.4/L.682, Fragmentation of International Law, (ILC 2006), op. cit., para 308, p. 159. 
73 VCLT, Article 60(2)(c). 
74 Oscar Chinn case, 12 December 1934, PCIJ, Series A/B, no 63. 
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reinforced his view.75 The effectiveness of absolute treaties depends on compliance with all of 
its provisions by all of its parties; if two or more parties derogate from one of its provisions 
they derogate from the treaty as a whole, effecting the legal positions of all of the parties and 
in consequence impacting on the object and purpose of the treaty. Klabbers notes that plans 
within the EU, in the late 1990s, to de-activate the Refugee Convention76 between Member 
States of the EU77 ran into criticism that this would result in an impermissible modification 
between some of the Refugee Convention’s parties difficult to reconcile with article 41(1) (b) 
as it would affect the definition of refugee in article 1 of the Refugee Convention and was 
incompatible with the effective execution of the Convention’s object and purpose. 
 
So the question comes down squarely to this: are the drug conventions of a reciprocal type, 
permitting inter se variation because their provisions are in their nature ‘quasi-bilateral’, or are 
they more integrated or even absolute, where such variation is not permissible because to 
continue the culinary metaphor the menu is set and cannot be broken up à la carte by parties 
no longer wishing to eat all of the courses. At first glance the general character of the drug 
conventions suggests they form an integrated interdependent regime. They satisfy conditions 
for such absolute treaties identified by Harvard Research in 1935: they have been almost 
universally subscribed to by states, their provisions have a legislative character, and they have 
been implemented in a uniform fashion.78 It is for that reason they have been identified as 
constituting a whole and archetypal ‘global prohibition regime’,79 which suggests their rules 
are integrated and cannot be disassembled by reluctant parties who would defeat their purpose 
if they entered into an inter se agreement to de-schedule cannabis and permit its non- scientific 
or non-medical production, supply and use in contravention of article 4 of the 1961 Single 
Convention. 
 
Digging a little deeper, however, it is arguable that a change in the system of control of cannabis 
away from strict prohibition would neither lead to a radical change in the position of all of the 
other parties nor conflict with an entirely unassailable foundational purpose of the drug 
conventions. The drug conventions do not have the same level of functional obligation as, for 
example, the International Space Station Intergovernmental Agreement, where the fifteen 
states parties involved agreed to ‘establish a long-term international cooperative framework’ 
for the design, development and operation of an ‘integrated International Space Station’ to 
which each participating state agreed to contribute certain ‘elements’.80 An inter se agreement 
would not be permissible to vary the obligations in the Space Station treaty because it would 
mean the station would not function. Treaty regimes controlling commodities like the drug 
conventions are functionally integrated in different degrees in regard to different substances. 
As described above, both the 1961 Single Convention and the 1971 Convention included 
provisions allowing parties to exempt themselves—by means of a (transitional) reservation or 
a notification of non-acceptance—from the control regime for a specific substance under 
certain circumstances and conditions. On that basis, it could be argued that an inter se 
 
75 Ibid, referring to article 36 of the Berlin Act. 
76 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 150; in force 22 April 1954. See 
also, article 7 of the ICCPR, the right not to be returned to a country where they may be ‘subjected to torture or 
to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.’ 
77 Jan Klabbers, “Treaties – Object and Purpose”, in: Max Planck Encylopedia of Public International Law 
(Oxford: OUP, 2006), para 11. 
78 Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, Research in International Law under the Auspices of the Faculty of 
the Harvard Law School, in: American Journal of International Law, Suppl, 1935, vol 29(4), p. 1018. 
79 Ethan Nadelmann, “Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society”, in: 
International Organisation (1990), No. 44, pp. 479 and 484. 
80 International Space Station Intergovernmental Agreement, 29 January 1998; in force 27 March 2001; Art. 1. 
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agreement among a group of countries which seeks a collective exemption from the cannabis-
specific provisions of the drug control treaty regime would not be prima facie ‘incompatible 
with the effective execution of the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole’ or necessarily 
affect the rights of other parties. 
 
At a more specific level, if a particular State that is party to an inter se agreement permits a 
cannabis market for non-medical or scientific purposes it will have an impact of a functional 
kind—the particular function being domestic suppression of cannabis so as to ensure cannabis 
does not flow across borders into those that are not party to the inter se agreement states— 
when cannabis actually begins to be trafficked across borders. At that point, the latter states 
will rightly be able to complain that the former state is in breach of its drug convention 
obligations because its conduct (in the form of an omission to control the transboundary traffic) 
will place a burden on the latter states. As Room et al. cautioned in the report of the Global 
Cannabis Commission: 
 
there will be vociferous opposition from a number of quarters’ to any moves to reform and 
therefore ‘it would be wise for a state or states which are moving outside the present 
conventions to give reassurances that they will continue a commitment to some aspects of the 
current regime—in particular to controls on international trade which maintain comity, the 
principle that other states’ domestic arrangements, for instance of cannabis prohibition, will be 
honoured.81 
 
To avoid an argument about functional integration being disrupted, the inter se agreement 
would have to be based on domestic markets that are isolated from non-parties to the inter se 
agreement. An assumption that a shift to a regulated market among certain states parties would 
increase the transnational flow of cannabis into states parties not party to the inter se agreement 
is, however, questionable. The international drug control system is currently ineffective in 
preventing the international illegal traffic of cannabis in spite of the illegality of this traffic in 
all states parties. A strictly controlled legal regulated market is likely to prove more effective 
in preventing the illicit export of cannabis from regulated jurisdictions in comparison to the 
current situation because state controls over the substance are likely to be tighter and more 
widely respected than is currently the case, precisely because the states party to the modifying 
treaty would be operating in an environment of acute awareness of not violating the other 
parties to the drug conventions rights and obligations (and this would include control of parallel 
illegal markets). Thus, counter intuitively, a legally regulated market in parties to the inter se 
agreement may well benefit non-parties to the agreement instead of harming them.   
 
7 The ‘Absolute’ Nature of Prohibition 
 
The drug conventions do require a certain degree of normative integration in order to achieve 
their overall functional purposes. This is revealed through internal elements of the treaty such 
as statements about the need for ‘universal action’ in paragraph three of the preamble to the 
Single Convention, and through external state practice such as the reiteration in GA Resolutions 
that there is a duty to implement ‘as a matter of priority, all the provisions’ of the drug control 
conventions,82 and a ‘collective responsibility to uphold the principles of human dignity, 
 
81 Robin Room, Benedikt Fischer, Wayne Hall, Simon Lenton, Peter Reuter and Amanda Feilding (convener), 
Cannabis Policy: Moving Beyond Stalemate, The Global Cannabis Commission Report, Beckley 
Foundation/Oxford University Press, September 2008, pp. 167–168. 
82 A/RES/72/198, International cooperation to address and counter the world drug problem, 29 January 2018, 
Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 19 December 2017, paragraph 93. 
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equality and equity at the global level’.83 It is much more difficult to sustain the notion that this 
level of normative integration implies that the drug conventions have established a system 
where states have rights in regard to the conduct of other states in regard to specific drugs 
within their own domain, even if it does not have a direct cross-border effect. Prior to 1961 the 
drug control system was interpreted in such a way as to respect differences between the laws 
of the state parties. The system functioned to prevent the uncontrolled export of certain 
substances to states that have prohibited those substances.84 This tolerance of difference was 
fundamental to the origins of the international control system prior to 1946, until a 
transformation of the system was undertaken in the post-War period which culminated in the 
1961 Convention. It involved the attempt to convert what had been essentially a ‘reciprocal’ 
system into a morally charged ‘absolute’ principle of prohibition. 
 
This transformation never achieved that goal.85 The drug conventions are integrated to a degree, 
but not so integrated that they consist of an absolute normative regime akin to, for example, 
that created in regard to prohibition of genocide by the Genocide Convention of 1949.86 They 
have neither achieved ius cogens status nor are they part of customary international law.87 To 
qualify as a ius cogens rule absolute prohibition would first have to qualify as a norm of general 
international law (i.e. a rule of customary international law) and second be recognized by the 
international community as a whole as a rule from which no derogation is permitted.88  There is 
no evidence in state practice and opinio iuris that it has achieved even the status of customary 
international law, never mind made it into the ranks of the elite sub-set of rules of custom that 
qualify as ius cogens. There is no-evidence from current states parties to the Single convention 
that they consider the foundational provision of treaty-based prohibition, article 4(c) of the 
Single convention, is anything more than a treaty obligation. In particular given that most states 
are parties to the Single Convention, there is no evidence of non-parties acknowledging that 
independent of any treaty provision, the limitation to scientific and medical purposes is a norm 
by which they are bound as a matter of customary international law.  Nor is there any practice 
to substantiate a claim that the international community of states as a whole must recognise 
and accept that article 4(c) cannot be derogated from. There is no practice to suggest they have 
always considered that article 4(c) will remain immutable and never subject to repeal. On the 
similarly fundamental question of whether drug trafficking was contrary to the purposes of the 
UN, the Canadian Supreme Court answered in the negative.89 And finally, the 1961 Convention 
 
83 A/RES/55/2, United Nations Millenium Declaration, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, 8 
September 2000. The Declaration reiterates this common duty in para 2 and then later mentions the need to 
redouble efforts to ‘counter the world drug problem’ in para 9. 
84 See the account given of the history of the system in: E/INCB/W.22, The Genesis of International Control of 
cannabis – 1912 to 1978, International Narcotics Control Board, Twenty-third session, 12 May 1978; and 
Hamilton Wright, “The International Opium Conference”, in: American Journal of International Law, Vol. 7, 
No. 1 (January 1913), pp. 108-139. 
85 See David Bewley-Taylor and Martin Jelsma, “Regime change: Re-visiting the 1961 Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs”, in: International Journal of Drug Policy, Vol. 23, No. 1 (January 2012), pp. 72-81. 
86 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, International 
Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15. 
87 P.H.P.H.M.C. (Piet Hein) van Kempen and Masha Federova, International Recht en Cannabis II, Regulering 
van cannabisteelt en -handel voor recreatief gebruik: positieve mensenrechtenverplichtingen versus  
VN-drugsverdragen (Deventer: Kluwer, 2016), p. 264. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice recognised in his Third Report on 
the Law of Treaties, A/CN/4/115 (1958), para 29, p. 30, that states may depart from a rule in a treaty through an 
inter se agreement unless it is in the nature of a ius cogens rule. 
88 A/CN.4/706, International Law Commission, Second report on jus cogens by Dire Tladi, Special Rapporteur, 
16 March 2017, para 43, pp. 21-22. 
89 Pushpanathan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1 SCR 98, ILDC 182 (CA 1998), paras 
64, 69, 72. 
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itself contains provisions for amendment and there is no specific restriction made in regard to 
article 4(c).  
 
It is also not plausible to argue that the rules underpinning absolute prohibition are erga omnes 
obligations, which the international community as a whole are required to observe, as is the 
case with human rights conventions.90 With regard to erga omnes obligations, non-injured 
States may be entitled to invoke a breach, according to the ILC, because the “collective interest 
of treaty parties has been violated”.91 The drug conventions, however, do not meet the erga 
omnes criteria; failure to adhere to their obligations does not necessarily have consequences 
for all other parties, it will depend on the circumstances. Interestingly, there is also no specific 
procedure in the conventions for the making of complaints by states that are not directly 
affected.92 
 
It is thus untenable to argue that a government regulated market in cannabis comes close to 
violate a ius cogens or erga omnes norm and is therefore ipso facto in violation of the rights of 
the other parties, unlike inter se modification of a human rights convention which would result 
in a violation of an absolute regime. As a practical matter, states that object to an inter se 
agreement may contest the degree of integration of the global drug control system, but the onus 
would be on them to show that the system was integrated in an absolute manner in regard to 
the particular substance in question. 
 
Looking more closely at the nature of the obligations in the regime in regard to particular 
substances, the UN drug control regime applies to a specific set of substances listed on the 
treaty schedules, which are subject to exemptions, varying levels of control, review procedures 
and regular changes. Early scheduling decisions, especially on cannabis, coca and opium, have 
often been criticised for being influenced by colonial heritage, cultural and racial prejudices, 
and ideology more than scientific evidence.93 Many other psychoactive substances, including 
harmful ones like alcohol and tobacco, have never been placed under international control at 
all, or—in the case of tobacco—under a fundamentally different control regime of a more 
regulatory than prohibitive nature.94 It is therefore difficult to argue that the UN drug control 
treaty regime somehow embodies an ‘absolute’ prohibition principle based on a universal and 
unexceptionable policy goal of limiting all psychoactive drugs exclusively to medical and 
scientific purposes, comparable to, for example, the absolute nature of the prohibition of torture 
under international law from which derogation by means of reservation or inter se modification 
obviously would not be permissible. 
 
8 Precedents and Practices 
 
8.1 The 1925 and 1931 ‘closed agreements’ 
Examples of inter se agreements that have raised issues about compatibility with previous drug 
 
90 P.H.P.H.M.C. (Piet Hein) van Kempen and Masha Federova, International Recht en Cannabis II (2016), op. 
cit., pp. 254-259. 
91 A/CN.4/L.682, Fragmentation of International Law, (ILC 2006), op. cit., para 393, p. 199. 
92 P.H.P.H.M.C. (Piet Hein) van Kempen and Masha Federova, International Recht en Cannabis II (2016), op. 
cit., pp. 267-268.  
93 David Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition 
(2014), op. cit., pp. 8-31; and Mario Argandoña, Anthony Henman, Ximena Echeverría, Pien Metaal, Martin 
Jelsma, Ricardo Soberón, Coca Yes, Cocaine No? Legal options for the coca leaf, TNI Drugs & Conflict Debate 
Paper 13, Amsterdam: May 2006, pp. 4-9. 
94 WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, adopted by the World Health Assembly on 21 May 2003, 
in force February 2005. 
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control treaties are rare. One potential example involves the continued reliance during the League 
era of states that produced opium on regulated markets when other states wished to proceed to 
total prohibition for non- medical purposes. Article 2 of the 1925 Geneva International Opium 
Convention95 obliged parties to undertake to enact law for the effective control of the production 
of opium. In spite of this promise made to other states parties to the 1925 Convention, opium 
producer states opted to rely on government monopolies to control production, and this approach 
was formalised in two ‘closed agreements’, the 1925 Agreement Concerning the Suppression of 
the Manufacture of, Internal Trade in, and Use of, Prepared Opium,96 and the 1931 Agreement 
Concerning the Suppression of Opium Smoking97 which were limited to the opium producer 
states ‘which still recognise the use of prepared opium’, at the time largely under colonial rule.98 
 
Whether the special agreements were a true inter se modification is difficult to say. The 1925 
Special Agreement preceded the 1925 Geneva Convention, but the U.S. and some others 
regarded it as an agreement contrary to the overall purpose of the 1912 The Hague Opium 
Convention. It led to the U.S. and China walking out of the negotiations of the 1925 Geneva 
Convention, arguing that ‘[t]here is no likelihood under present conditions that the production 
of raw opium and coca leaves will be restricted to the medicinal and scientific needs of the 
world’.99 In the 1931 Agreement, Britain, France, India, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal and 
Siam (now Thailand) ‘decided to review the position in regard to the application in their Far-
Eastern possessions and territories’ of the earlier instruments and agreed to ‘supplement’ them 
with a number of measures between themselves alone.100 The starting point for the 1931 
Conference were the recommendations of the Commission of Enquiry into the Control of 
Opium Smoking in the Far East, which included suggestions for a revision of some of the 
provisions of the 1912 Opium Convention and the 1925 Geneva Opium Agreement: 
 
The Commission had never imagined that the stipulations of either international or municipal 
law held good for ever. They were quite aware that many of their recommendations necessitated 
changes in international conventions or agreements and in the national systems of law; but they 
had not hesitated on that account to put them forward, for they were convinced that certain 
changes were necessary if progress was to be made.101 
 
The 1925 Geneva Convention represented a political compromise in the sense that its article 5 
obligation to ‘enact effective laws or regulations to limit exclusively to medical and scientific 
purposes the manufacture, import, sale, distribution, export and use’ of ‘manufactured drugs’ 
had been limited in the case of opium to ‘medicinal opium’ only, defined in article I to mean 
‘raw opium which has undergone the processes necessary to adapt it for medicinal use in 
accordance with the requirements of the national pharmacopoeia’. With regard to other opium 
products, the contracting parties of the 1931 Agreement agreed that ‘retail sale and distribution 
of opium shall take place only from Government shops … or from shops managed, under 
Government supervision’; a provision which ‘need not be applied if a system of licensing and 
 
95 Geneva, 19 February 1925, 81 LNTS 317, in force September 1928. 
96 Geneva, 11 February, 1925, 51 LNTS 337, in force July 1926. 
97 Bangkok, 27 November 1931, 177 LNTS 373, in force April 1937. 
98 Quincy Wright, “The Opium Question”, in: American Journal of International Law, Vol. 18, No. 2 (April 
1924). pp. 281-295. 
99 Quincy Wright, “The Opium Conferences”, in: American Journal of International Law, Vol. 19, No. 3 (July 
1925), p. 561. 
100 Bangkok, 27 November 1931, 177 LNTS 373, in force April 1937, pp. 2-3. 
101 C.577.M.284.1932.XI, League of Nations, Conference on the Suppression of Opium-Smoking Convened 
Under Article XII of the Geneva Opium Agreement, 1925, Bangkok, November 9th to 27th, 1931, Minutes of the 
Meetings and Documents Submitted to the Conference, Geneva, August 1932, p. 97. 
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rationing of smokers is in force, which affords equivalent or more effective guarantees’ (article 
I) and that ‘[p]ersons under twenty-one years of age shall be prohibited from smoking opium 
and from entering any smoking-establishment’ (article II). The parties furthermore derogated 
from certain earlier restrictions on international trade by agreeing that ‘it shall be permissible 
for a Government Monopoly to be supplied with prepared opium from the factory of a 
Government Monopoly in another territory of the same Power’ (article IV). There is thus an 
argument that the 1931 Agreement clashed with a number of provisions of the 1925 Geneva 
Convention, and could be seen as an early example of an inter se modification agreement to 
loosen certain drug control treaty obligations for a group of states parties. 
 
8.2 The Bolivian reservation on coca leaf 
Bolivia’s successful attempt to derogate from its drug control treaty obligations regarding the 
coca leaf serves if not as a strict precedent of an inter se agreement then at least as an analogous 
challenge to the drug conventions in regard to the level of control over a specific substance. 
After a failed attempt to amend the Single Convention’s Article 49, which obliges parties to 
abolish coca leaf chewing within 25 years, in June 2011 Bolivia became the first country to 
denounce the treaty, re-acceding early 2013 with the following reservation: 
 
The Plurinational State of Bolivia reserves the right to allow in its territory: traditional coca leaf 
chewing, the consumption and use of the coca leaf in its natural state; for cultural and medicinal 
purposes; for its use in infusions, and also the cultivation, trade and possession of the coca leaf 
to the extent necessary for these licit purposes. At the same time, the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia will continue to take all necessary measures to control the cultivation of coca in order 
to prevent its abuse and the illicit production of the narcotic drugs which may be extracted from 
the leaf.102 
 
Despite a call from the INCB arguing that Bolivia’s move ‘would undermine the integrity of 
the global drug control system’,103 the number of objections fell far short of the one- third of 
treaty parties (62) required to block it. The objections to Bolivia’s reservation came primarily 
from G8 and EU countries.104 According to Arp, objection only from a selective group may 
suggest that a denunciation and re- accession with a reservation cannot be seen as contrary to 
internationally accepted norms of customary law: ‘For most other states, such a practice seems 
to be an acceptable procedure to formulate a late reservation to a treaty. At least these states’ 
silence when faced with such a situation—as notably in the Bolivian example—implies their 
acquiescence.’105 Arp also notes that ‘[t]he corpus of international treaty law adopted after 
 
102 This is a corrected translation from Bolivia’s original notification in Spanish. The two different versions of 
the official English translation available in the UN treaty depository both contain minor but legally relevant 
mistakes, see C.N.829.2011.TREATIES-28 (Depositary Notification), Bolivia (Plurinational State of): 
Communication (10 January 2012). The original Spanish text as submitted by Bolivia reads: ‘El Estado 
Plurinacional de Bolivia, se reserva el derecho de permitir en su territorio la masticación tradicional de la Hoja 
de Coca, el consumo y el uso de la Hoja de Coca en su estado natural; para fines culturales y medicinales; como 
su uso en infusión, así como también el cultivo, el comercio y la posesión de la Hoja de Coca en la extensión 
necesaria para estos propósitos lícitos. Al mismo tiempo, el Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia seguirá tomando 
todas las medidas necesarias para controlar el cultivo de Coca para prevenir su abuso y la producción ilícita de 
estupefacientes que pueden extraerse de las hojas.’ 
103 UNIS/NAR/1114, International Narcotics Control Board Regrets Bolivia’s Denunciation of the Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, UN Information Service, press release (5 July 2011). 
104 TNI/WOLA, Bolivia wins a rightful victory on the coca leaf - Creates a positive example for modernizing the 
UN drug conventions, press release (11 January 2013). The G-8 countries (United States, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, Canada and the Russian Federation) plus Sweden, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Finland, Israel, Ireland, and Mexico objected to Bolivia’s reservation. 
105 Björn Arp, “Denunciation Followed by Re-Accession with Reservations to a Treaty: A Critical Appraisal of 
Contemporary State Practice”, in: Netherlands International Law Review, Volume 61, Issue 2 (June 2014), p. 
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World War II is aging, and seldom do those treaties provide for flexible procedures to adapt to 
new circumstances’.106 After analysing five recent cases involving different unrelated treaty 
regimes, he goes on to argue that in some circumstances the acceptability of the controversial 
procedure increases in times of normative change: 
 
The European states seem not to oppose the denunciation and re-accession with a reservation when 
this forms part of a broader process of the reform and change of international law. The Swedish 
example shows that no state objects to the denunciation and re-accession with a reservation if the 
interested states were already critical about the existing treaty rules that were affected by the 
reservation.107 
 
The Bolivian derogation from certain treaty obligations regarding the coca leaf does not appear 
to have affected the rights of other parties in any serious way. Other examples like khat, kratom 
and ephedra, psychoactive plants with stimulant properties comparable to coca, which are not 
controlled under the international drugs conventions but are subjected to widely varying degrees 
of national controls and prohibitions, provide further evidence for the possibility of co-existence 
in practice of fundamentally different control regimes for the same substance. In the case of 
cannabis, the early stages of ‘soft defection’ did lead to diplomatic tensions, for example between 
the Netherlands and neighbouring countries, but the rapidly expanding divergence in cannabis 
policies at national and sub-national levels, including the fully legally regulated markets in U.S. 
states and Uruguay, have thus far not caused major problems with neighbouring jurisdictions that 
maintain a prohibitionist approach. 
 
The fact that in the Bolivian case none of the objecting states considered the reservation to be 
an obstacle for the re-entry into force of the Convention between them and Bolivia108 could be 
interpreted as a tacit agreement that treaty provisions regarding specific substances are in 
principle ‘separable from the remainder of the treaty with regard to their application’.109 And, 
as noted above, the rules applicable to reservations are in principle the same as those for a 
collective derogation from certain treaty obligations by means of an inter se modification 
agreement. 
 
8.3 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
Analogous instruments to inter se agreements that appear to conflict with the terms of the original 
convention can be found in other areas of law. Perhaps the most famous is the 1994 Agreement 
Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (the 
‘Deep Sea Bed Agreement’, UNCLOS),110 used to coax Western states into supporting the 
UNCLOS which was not yet in force even though the Agreement appeared to contradict the 
provisions of the UNCLOS in regard to the mining of the deep sea bed, which in effect the 
Agreement amended.111 Participants in the informal consultations, however, rejected the idea of 
 
164. 
106 Ibid., p. 145. 
107 Ibid., p. 164. 
108 See for example C.N.361.2012.TREATIES-VI.18 (Depositary Notification), United States of America: 
Objection to the Reservation Contained in the Communication by the Plurinational State of Bolivia (3 July 
2012): ‘Should Bolivia’s reservation be deemed to be permitted in accordance with Article 50, paragraph 3 of 
the Convention, this objection would not constitute an obstacle to the entry into force of the Convention 
between the United States and Bolivia, but the United States would not assume toward Bolivia any legal 
obligation under the Convention that is affected by the reservation’ (most other objecting states used similar 
wording). 
109 VCLT, Separability of treaty provisions, Article 44. 
110 Adopted by the General Assembly on 28 July 1994, 1836 UNTS 42, in force 1996. 
111 Anthony Aust, Amendment of Treaties (2010), op. cit., pp. 41 and 53. 
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a protocol of amendment, preferring the label of an ‘implementation agreement’. According to 
Harrison, ‘[w]hilst many of the basic principles underlying the deep seabed mining regime remain 
the same, the detailed provisions are the subject of far-reaching reform. The language of the 
Agreement is straightforward and uncompromising. Several provisions of the Convention are 
simply “disapplied”.’112 States not yet party to UNCLOS had to become party to the Agreement 
and the main treaty which it contradicted, while states already party to UNCLOS have been taken 
to have acquiesced in this ‘imaginative’ route towards maintaining universal participation in the 
law of the sea. Formally, however, with regard to states which became party to the Convention 
prior to the adoption of the Agreement, it is only binding on those that have accepted it, and there 
are a number of UNCLOS parties—some 35—for which the 1994 Agreement is not yet law.113 
In similar fashion an inter se agreement on cannabis regulation which deviates from strict 
prohibition can be rationalised on the basis of maintaining universal subscription to the principal 
elements of the international drug control system, while allowing parties to ‘disapply’ the 
implementation of certain provisions. 
 
9 Notification and Objections 
 
‘It is generally assumed,’ according to the ILC, ‘that participation in a multilateral treaty creates 
a community of interests and a solidarity implying an entitlement for the parties to express their 
views on the compatibility of special arrangements concluded between some of them with the 
overall regime of the treaty.’114 Article 41(2) of the VCLT provides therefore for a duty on those 
parties intending to enter such an inter se agreement to notify the other parties to the drug 
conventions and of the particular modification for which the inter se agreement provides. It 
makes it clear that compliance with article 41 must be ensured before such a treaty is entered 
into as the simple act of notification in time of their precise intentions (which should be worked 
out by that point) serves as a warning and conveys the content of the proposed changes allowing 
due diligence in this regard by the other parties who may if they feel it necessary voice their 
objections.115 However, it is not necessary to do so at an early stage: 
 
The Commission considered that it is unnecessary and even inadvisable to require notice to be 
given while a proposal is merely germinating and still at an exploratory stage. It therefore 
expressed the requirement in terms of notifying their “intention to conclude the agreement and ... 
the modifications to the treaty for which it provides” in order to indicate that it is only when a 
negotiation of an inter se agreement has reached a mature stage that notification need be given to 
the other parties.116 
 
The ILC study group on the ‘Fragmentation of International Law’ dealt in considerable detail 
with the inter se issue, and confirmed that ‘notification must be given at a relatively advanced 
stage in the negotiation of the inter se agreement but nevertheless sufficiently prior to its 
conclusion so as to enable a meaningful reaction’.117 It is for each other party to make up their 
mind whether the inter se agreement breaches the general agreement.118 However, the legal effect 
of an objection made after notification is uncertain; ‘it seems clear that the inter se agreement 
 
112 James Harrison, Evolution of the law of the sea: developments in law-making in the wake of the 1982 Law of 
the Sea Convention, School of Law, University of Edinburgh (5 July 2007), p. 99. 
113 Ibid., pp. 100-101. 
114 A/CN.4/L.682, Fragmentation of International Law (ILC 2006), op. cit., para 307, p. 158. 
115 Rigaux and Simon (2011), op. cit., pp. 989 and 1006-7. 
116 Arthur Watts (ed.), The International Law Commission, 1949-1998: The Treaties, Oxford University Press 
1999, p. 717. 
117 A/CN.4/L.682, Fragmentation of International Law (ILC 2006), op. cit., para 318, p. 164. 
118 Ibid., para 313, p. 161, relying on the Reservations opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 26. 
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concluded in deviation from the original agreement is not thereby invalidated’, it depends on an 
interpretation of the original treaty as to what consequences should follow.119 
 
The procedural requirement of notification at such a late stage, means that the States who are 
germinating the inter se agreement are placed in the strategically fortunate position of being 
able to iron out the nature of their agreement, before bringing it officially to the notice of other 
parties to the prior agreement. In result, objectors from outside the group cannot disrupt the 
process before it is settled. 
 
Inter se modification is not akin to amendment of the general body of the treaty ‘as between all 
parties’, governed by article 40 of the VCLT, precisely because not all the parties participate. It 
permits modification among a restricted group of parties so long as the rights and obligations of 
the whole group under the treaty are  respected. If its terms are not observed, conclusion of an 
inter se agreement may lead to accusations of breach of the drug conventions triggering state 
responsibility, but that is not the main concern here. Firstly because, as the Bolivian example has 
shown, even if some other parties agree a material breach has occurred and the integrity of the 
treaty is compromised, a response of termination of the treaty by those states that consider their 
rights affected is highly unlikely because that would only further erode the effective 
implementation of the treaty they intend to protect, so would not be in their interest. And secondly 
because the reality is that the rapidly changing drug policy landscape has already led to treaty 
breaches and those are only likely to increase; the inter se modification would not be the cause 
of the breach, but rather an attempt to reconcile under international law breaches that are already 
happening in practice. 
 
10 Concluding Reflections 
 
Reaching a new global consensus to revise or amend the UN drug control conventions in order 
to accommodate legally regulated markets for cannabis, coca or other psychoactive plants and 
substances controlled under these treaties, does not appear to be a viable political scenario for 
the short-term foreseeable future. The inability to reach global consensus is not limited to drug 
control; it is a dilemma that links drug control with other global issues where global consensus 
is breaking down.120 Meanwhile, the limits of flexible treaty interpretations have been reached 
and overstretching them any further with legally dubious arguments would result in 
undermining basic principles of international law.121 States that intend to move towards legal 
regulation, or that have already done so, are therefore obliged to explore other options to 
reconcile such policy changes with their obligations under international law. Only a few options 
are available that do not require the consent of all the treaty parties.122 
 
The WHO can recommend after a critical review by its Expert Committee on Drug Dependence 
(ECDD) to ‘un-schedule’ a controlled substance (remove it from the treaty schedules), and the 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs can adopt the recommendation by a simple or two-thirds 
majority vote (for the 1961 and 1971 conventions respectively). As noted above, the WHO 
 
119 Ibid., para 319, p. 164. 
120 See, for example, Kevin Rudd, “Wresting Order from Chaos”, in: The World Today, Vol. 71, No. 3 (June-
July 2015), pp. 14-15. 
121 Robert C. Zitt, “Should I Stay or Should I Go?: Why Bolivian Tactics and U.S. "Flexibility" Undermine the 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs”, in: Brooklyn Journal of International Law, No. 42 (2016), p. 525. 
122 David Bewley-Taylor, Martin Jelsma and Steve Rolles, Cannabis Regulation and the UN Drug Treaties – 
Strategies for Reform, Briefing Paper, WOLA/TNI/GDPO/MUCD/HRDP/CDPC/Canadian HIVAIDS Legal 
Network (June 2016), pp 9-13. 
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Expert Committee is in fact undertaking a review process for cannabis and a special ECDD 
meeting to discuss pre-reviews of cannabis-related substances took place in June 2018.123 The 
outcome of the subsequent critical review could come to the CND agenda earliest by March 
2019 and will probably result in its deletion from Schedule 4, and possibly to a de-scheduling 
from Schedule 1 to 2. It is, however, unlikely under current political circumstances that a WHO 
recommendation to delete all cannabis-related substances from the treaty schedules altogether 
would get the required CND majority. 
 
The only other available options that do not require consensus are either unilaterally by late 
reservations or denunciation and re- accession with new reservations, or collectively by inter 
se modification agreements among like-minded countries. All of these options are controversial 
because a generalized application of such procedures would erode the stability of international 
treaty regimes. Recourse to these options for the purpose of legitimising cannabis regulation 
will be contested, as was the case with Bolivia’s procedure which—in the end successfully—
legitimised the legal regulation of its domestic coca market. 
 
Nevertheless, applied with caution and reason under exceptional circumstances, inter se treaty 
modification appears to provide a useful safety valve for collective action to adjust a treaty 
regime frozen in time such as the UN drug control conventions, even when potentially the 
majority of states might still be supportive of continued prohibition.124 It would require that the 
like-minded agreement includes a clear commitment to the original treaty aim to promote the 
health and welfare of humankind and to the original treaty obligations vis-à-vis countries not 
party to the inter se agreement. Few other routes are available that could allow more 
manoeuvring within the treaty regime while avoiding the cumbersome process of unanimous 
approval; under such circumstances, as Klabbers notes, the inter se option is ‘perhaps the most 
elegant way out’.125 The specific advantages of adopting an inter se agreement in regard to 
cannabis are: 
 
• It could provide a model that respects international law while moving beyond dubious 
flexibility arguments that have negative implications for the integrity of international law 
beyond drug control. 
• It could provide a basis for an alternative group response to the current control model, 
serving as a focus point for states parties to the drug control regime that are struggling to 
apply the current prohibitive model and seeking a more promising alternative. 
• It would signal the intention of the parties to the inter se agreement to permanently change 
their system of regulation of cannabis and their relationship with the UN drug control 
regime. 
• It would recognise that cannabis policy trends have moved beyond the realms of treaty 
flexibility and that today’s political realities and limitations of the UN drug policy making 
mechanisms present obstacles for treaty amendments or other scenarios for a consensus-
driven evolution of the UN drug control treaty regime. 
 
123 E/CN.7/2016/CRP.13, Extract from the Report of the 38th Expert Committee on Drug Dependence, convened 
from 14 to 18 November 2016, at WHO headquarters in Geneva, 30 November 2016, p. 7. 
124 David Bewley-Taylor and Malgosia Fitzmaurice, The Modernization of Treaty Regimes: The Contrasting 
Cases of International Drug Control and Environmental Regulation, Working/Draft Paper, Expert Seminar on 
Cannabis Regulation and the UN Drug Control Treaties (Amsterdam: 26-28 October, 2017). 
125 Jan Klabbers, “Treaties, Amendment and Revision,” in: Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law (December 2006), p. 1086. 
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• It would provide a framework for a more principled compliance with the underlying goal 
and purpose of the conventions, prioritising respect for human rights, health care and crime 
prevention. 
• It would provide opportunities to experiment and learn from different models of regulation. 
• It would open the possibility of international trade, enabling small cannabis farmers in 
traditional Southern producing countries to start producing for the regulated licit markets. 
Closed national systems are unlikely to fully replace existing illicit markets that are partly 
dependent on international trade to accommodate product variety and quality, cultural 
diversity and consumer preferences. Alternative development schemes aiming to shift 
cannabis farmers to other products have failed; the only viable option is to involve them in 
the opening licit cannabis markets for medicinal and other uses. 
 
The possibility of inter se modification was specifically designed to find a balance between the 
stability of treaty regimes and the necessity of change in absence of consensus in order to 
respond to the social conditions in certain like-minded states. The circumstances in which the 
UN drug control treaty regime finds itself today—systemic challenges and inconsistencies, 
increasing tensions with State practices, huge political and procedural obstacles to 
amendments, and unilateral escape attempts—merit a careful consideration of the legitimacy 
of its application. A coordinated collective response has clear benefits compared to a chaotic 
scenario of a growing number of different unilateral reservations and questionable re-
interpretations.  Indeed, inter se modification would facilitate the development of what, within 
an international policy environment characterized by faux consensus, is increasingly necessary: 
a ‘multi- speed drug control system’126 operating within the boundaries of international law, 
rather than one that strains against them. It could also include a mechanism such as a Conference 
of the inter se Parties (COISP) to regularly review the agreements and enable further evolution 
based on lessons learned, and in particular to prevent violation of the rights of the other parties 
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